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Home | Urban Congestion Charge | Urban Congestion Charge Case Evidence | Stockholm

Policy: Stockholm

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Policy Objectives

In response to growing traffic congestion in central Stockholm, on June 16th 2004, a congestion charge trial was implemented. The central objectives of the charging scheme includes:

  • Reduce traffic volumes on the busiest roads by 10-15%
  • Improve the flow of traffic on streets and roads
  • Reduce emissions of pollutants (including carbon dioxide) harmful to human health
  • To improve the urban environment as perceived by Stockholm residents
  • And to provide more resources for public transport.

Policy Structure

The trial consisted of extended public transport from August 22, 2005 to December 31st, 2006, and a congestion tax from January 3rd, 2006 until July 31st, 2006. The scheme consisted of a cordon based variable charge to enter the city centre, which covers an area of 29.5 km2 housing 275,000 inhabitants (36% of all the residents in Stockholm). The system had a single zone boundary encircling the inner city of Stockholm. The size of the tax varied by the time of day and was 10, 15, or 20 SEK (70p, £1 or £1.40 respectively). There was no charge outside of 6:30 am – 6:29 pm on weekdays, weekends, or public holidays (or the day before a public holiday). A combination of camera and DSRC (dedicated short range communications) ‘tag and beacon’ technologies were used for enforcement. Payment was made after passing a control point and had to be registered in a congestion tax account within 14 days (Atkins, 2006; EEA, 2008; OECD, 2008).

Exemptions to the charge included: emergency vehicles; buses over 14 tonnes; diplomatic cars; taxis; motorcycles; vehicles registered abroad; military vehicles; vehicles operating completely or partially on electricity or gas other than LPG, or on a fuel blend consisting predominantly of alcohol (Approximately 30% of vehicles were exempt from the charge) (Atkins, 2006; EEA, 2008).

Implementation & Operation

IBM, the prime contractor for the trial, was given a budget of SEK 3.8 billion. Making the scheme permanent is expected to yield a net revenue stream of about SEK 760 million (£53 million) (after deducting operating costs). The system will generate sufficient revenue to cover both investment and operational costs. Investment costs are expected to be recovered in 4 years (Dunning, 2006; Atkins, 2006).

Major Impacts

The largest impact was a larger than expected reduction in traffic flow with potentially positive environment and health benefits arising outside the main zone (EEA, 2008). The following key impacts were realized:

  • Reduction in car traffic (22 - 28%) within the inner city charging zone compared to the previous year over the same period (Figure 3-2)
  • Reduced congestion and improved accessibility within the zone and on major traffic routes
  • Reduced emissions (110 tonnes NOX, 37 tonnes PM10) and reductions in CO2 emissions in the inner city
  • Reduced noise levels
  • Modal shift towards public transport, cycling and walking (EEA, 2008; OECD, 2008).


Figure 3-2. Vehicles crossing Stockholm cordon on weekdays reduced on average by 22%

Source: OECD, 2008

A number of enhancements had been made to Stockholm’s public transport system in order to manage the increase in usage. The bus fleet was increased by 197 buses and 12 new express bus routes together with an extended service on 18 bus routes. Bus punctuality was improved as a result of the reduced traffic during the trial. Existing underground and commuter train service frequencies were also improved and new Park and Ride schemes in the region were implemented (Atkins, 2006; OECD, 2008; EEA, 2008).

At the start of the trial many Stockholm residents opposed the charge organising demonstrations to vent disapproval. By the time the trial had ended public opinion had shifted dramatically. In autumn 2005, approximately 55% of Stockholm county citizens opposed a congestion tax trial. By May 2006, those in opposition dropped to 41%. By the end of the trial in June 2006 more than 50% of residents supported the scheme (Figure 3-3). A city referendum further demonstrated that adverse public opinion could be turned around. Both the public and firms have become increasingly positive towards the congestion tax and the Stockholm trial especially as benefits have been realized (Atkins, 2006).


Figure 3-3. Shifting public opinion over the Stockholm road pricing trial period

Source: OECD, 2008


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